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THE POPULIST OBSTRUCTION OF REALITY: ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE 
Hartmut Behr 
 
Abstract- 
Populist movements are on the rise in Western societies. With US president Donald Trump, “Brexit”, and the 
likely significant 2017 election results of Le Pen in France, de Wilders in the Netherlands, and the AfD in 
Germany, a “cordon populiste” threatens to strangulate liberal democracy. Among the long list of threats of 
populist politics is – besides its crusades against democratic constitutional law, institutional checks and bal-
ancesr, civil and human rights, and international diplomacy – the strategic obstruction of our perception of 
reality. As the latter concerns the intellectual and moral fabric of a society, the delusion of reality is among 
the most severe dangers for democratic politics. We have been handed down analytical language to focus 
on this threat by the generation of scholars, who witnessed totalitarian movements in the 20th century. Not 
unsurprisingly, but indeed worryingly, their analytical frameworks apply to contemporary right-wing popu-
list politics.  
The following considerations will use Hannah Arendt’s characteristics of totalitarian movements 
and Eric Voegelin’s notion of “apperception” to analytically grasp the contemporary problem of obstructed 
reality, followed by some thoughts on how to respond to respective challenges. These final reflections focus 
on Higher Education. 
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Outline of an analysis 
It’s time to wake up and to add to moral disgust and democratic rejection the recognition that the contem-
porary right-wing populist threat to democracy is serious and its strategists are determined and resolute in 
transforming current societies and their constitutional, legal, institutional, and intellectual arrangements. 
They call themselves a movement, anti-establishment and anti-political, and indeed evince, in line with to-
talitarian movements in the 20th century, certain important characteristics:  
(1) demonstrating disrespect for the current (in our case ‘democratic’) political system while prioritiz-
ing the movement over the political system;  
(2) claiming the authentic representation of some genuine will that would provide a higher form of 
legitimacy while delegitimising different political views, thus being genuinely anti-pluralistic ;  
(3) an ideological claim of the possession of higher wisdom and subsequently the claim to truth and 
ubiquitous righteousness;  
(4) the call to action parallel to a rude devaluation of deliberation and reflection; and finally 
(5) the distortion and obstruction of our perception of reality through propagandistic simplifications 
and purposeful misleading ‘alternative’ representations.  
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Among these five characteristics of totalitarian movements – with continuous relevance analysed by Han-
nah Arendt in her book The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) – the last one on the distortion and obstruc-
tion of our perception of reality through propagandistic simplifications shall be looked at here a little closer. 
We are familiar with plenty of evidence of such distortion and obstruction through the creation of “alterna-
tive facts”, the career of conspiracy hypotheses among populists, or ‘fake news’, all encapsulated in the 
language of the so-called “post-factual”.  
 It is, of course, a philosophically complex and difficile question what “reality” is; I do not want to 
delve too deeply here into this question, but quite straightforwardly suggest Arendt’s notion of “factual 
truth” (Tatsachenwahrheiten) that helps us to immediately understand that we are facing the attempt to 
manipulate our perceptions: If, just one example, Kellyanne Conway, one main figure of Trump’s inner 
propaganda circle, speaks of the “Bowling Green massacre” to justify Trump’s anti-immigration order 
which, however, indeed never happened, while addressing our ignorance of what ostensibly she ‘knows’ by 
the non-coverage of this ‘event’ by the mainstream media, we have just one illustration of a strategic at-
tempt to distort and obstruct (our perception) of reality. This adds to a long list of likewise propagandistic 
strategies to manipulate reality during Trump’s election campaign and the first two weeks of his reign. An-
other example is Boris Johnson’s use of the manipulative number of £ 350 million in his “Brexit”campaign. 
Arendt became familiar with such strategic distortions and manipulations of reality from studying Joseph 
Goebbel’s propaganda machinery and subsequently calls this, too, the “refusal of reality” (which is strate-
gic; and probably psychopathic, too), typical for totalitarian movements. The coup d’état of the current sys-
tem and the erection of a new one necessitates the obstruction of society’s perception and the manipula-
tion of factual truths according to the movement’s interpretation of politics and history. In this context, the 
denial of factual truth and the re-interpretation of reality à la Conway or Johnson based upon its distortion 
is comparable to a factoid or half-truth – in contrast to an outright lie (this does not mean that outright lies 
would not happen and not be used, too) – that are more difficult to devalue than a clear lie as such devalu-
ation necessitates some form of deliberation and opens up interpretation that are shut-down, however, 
immediately by propagandists or allow for the introduction of further distortions (Trump’s White House 
Press Secretary Sean Spicer is an example at hand). A spiral of deliberate confusion begins, paired up with 
language games and new terminologies (such as “alternative facts”), so very well depicted by George Or-
well in “1984” and portrayed by Charlie Chaplin in The Great Dictator, with the aim to accomplish exegetic 
authority over reality. 
 This raises of course the question of what an appropriate perception of reality and “factual truth” 
is. This question is likewise worthy of extended philosophical discussions and we receive very different an-
swers from, philosophically speaking, realist, idealist, or rationalist perspectives; to cut these discussions 
short, however, I want to refer here, too, to Arendt’s notion of plurality in her The Human Condition (1958) 
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in combination with her observation of a totalitarian refusal of reality. According to Arendt, reality is genu-
inely pluralistic and we have to open ourselves up to this plurality. And perceiving reality as pluralistic must 
manifest in the language which we use to describe our experiences of this reality, does solidify in her notion 
of power through deliberation, and distinguishes humanity as social togetherness (in contrast to loneliness 
and isolation).  
 We do not yet have enough evidence to assess populist politics in relation to the exercise of power 
(apart from indices about Trump’s dismissal of the division of power and his proclivity of authoritarian 
reign) and concerning social coherence, but we do have strong and constant examples of Trump’s (and Ma-
rine Le Pen and Geert de Wilders use the same language in their campaigns) anti-pluralistic and distortingly 
simplifying rhetoric. A linguistic analysis of his speeches reveals the overwhelming frequency of some and 
mostly of two-syllables words as well as of a specific sentence construction that mainly uses short sentenc-
es and puts the emphasis of the utterance always at the end of the sentence (therefore often sacrificing 
grammatically correct language); also many statements are not worded as complete sentences, but are col-
lapsed into incoherent chunks and snapshots of ideas that haunt each other. According to the Flesch-
Kincaid Reading Test, Trump’s language corresponds to 4th grade. This language is by no means capable of 
representing the experience of social and political pluralities and the complexities that come with it (even if 
he liked); and thus is per se structurally closed-off, truncated from, and, in Arendt’s word, refusing reality. 
 To connect the arguments so far with the political analysis of totalitarianism and ideologies of 
Voegelin (and his 1938 Political Religions is seminal here), we can term the experience of realities as partic-
ipation in various areas of human existence. The importance lies on experiences of realities in the plural, 
being open to all of them, keeping them in balance, and qualifying them against one another in our political 
judgment. This openness towards plurality as human condition (a commitment that Voegelin shares with 
Arendt) is what Voegelin calls ‘apperception’. Thus, apperception results from the experience and aware-
ness of the human condition as genuinely plural and contingent upon historical and socio-political contexts. 
The analytical surplus through Voegelin is the awareness that there are political times when perceptions of 
reality have become distorted and, moreover, openness towards reality, thus apperception, must be re-
stored in order to rescue democratic politics from ideological deformation. Such restoration is called by 
Voegelin the recapturing of reality that works mainly via a reconstruction of the fundamental categories of 
political existence and political reality through a genealogy of political symbolizations of human experienc-
es. At the same time, one has to explore the grammar of the deformation (i.e., here the grammar of popu-
list politics) as empirical evidence for such deformations as well as directions and political strategies for res-
toration. What results from this?  
The result from this is a twofold practical-political consequence. First, any politics that attempts to, 
or actually does, violate the human condition, i.e., that pursues and implements political strategies that 
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harm plurality and the balance mentioned above are to be resisted. Voegelin calls the turning away from 
deformed politics ‘apostrophe’ and a disease of the mind. And second, politics that apperceives and is 
aware of the human condition aims at allowing and supporting the expression and symbolization of diversi-
ty and plurality. The thus concluding norm for democratic politics is the creation of openness and of spaces 
where such expressions and symbolizations can flourish. We can call these spaces ideal-typically democrat-
ic or republican spaces, or just spaces of humanity.  
So far we have an outline of an intellectual analysis of contemporary populist dark ghosts haunting 
democracy. Such an analysis entails, as alluded, mainly the elaboration of obstructions of our perception of 
reality as well as a related analysis of populist strategies to fabricate and spin-doctor a ‘new’, different (per-
ception of) reality. The latter very importantly comprises an analysis of populist language. Some evidence 
and theoretical discussion could be provided here; the remainder of this paper shall now be devoted to the 
practical question of how to respond to the threat of populism.  
 
Political responses 
The main focus of restoration is to resist populist distortion and deformation and to create at the same 
time democratic spaces for the expression of pluralism and diversity (next to resistance in terms of consti-
tutional, legal, and institutional fights within the constraints and possibilities of democratic political sys-
tems). This vital focus entails the restoration of political judgment that enables the form of resistance men-
tioned above in the first place. The practical question thus comes down to how restore and create demo-
cratic political judgment that seems to have gone lost in so many Western nations, otherwise the electoral 
successes of Trump and the “Brexiteers” and the looming significant results of populist movements in ap-
proaching 2017 elections in Germany, France, and the Netherlands would not be possible. The main avenue 
for restoring political judgment is, so the argument that will be sketched out below, education. 
 The idea of the university as an institution for the education of a democratic citizenry has been very 
prolific in Germany after the experience of the collapse of the Weimar Republic and National Socialism. 
Amongst writers, educators, and philosophers who emphasised this idea was most prominent Karl Jaspers 
who declared the university not only as a shelter and hotbed for the education of a democratic citizenry 
established with the skill of respective political judgement, but even as a condition of democracy per se. 
And the reason for this is quite clear: at university, but harking back to high school, young generations learn 
the ability to critically judge things of political importance, most importantly, among subject-specific 
knowledge, the distinction of different modes of knowledge claims and their respective validities. Given the 
wide range of academic subjects and all the diverse skills that young people are educated in, the mentioned 
ability to distinguish knowledge claims and their validities is in one way or another core to each discipline as 
they all teach epistemology and methods (indeed of very different kinds and occasionally very diverse, de-
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pending on the discipline and even within disciplines, yet they all have in common questions of knowledge 
production and means to scrutinise knowledge claims). Ideally speaking then, someone educated in critical 
thinking (I here do not allude to a specific social science version of critique, but to the general habitus of 
being sceptical and questioning; and this is not limited to the humanities or social sciences, but includes the 
‘hard sciences’ and economics, too) should be well equipped to, first, recognize, and second, resist the ma-
nipulative strategies of populist – indeed of all kinds of – propagandists; and to consequently disclose and 
debunk every attempt to manipulate and to then discredit everyone who attempts to manipulate; and, to 
be more concrete, to consequently turn one’s back to the likes of Trump, Johnson, de Wilders, le Pen, etc. 
and unvarnishedly unmask their language, policies, and statements as totalitarian attempts to distort our 
and mine, and your, and her, and their perception of, and relation to, reality and finally to our fellow hu-
man beings. This, we should not allow!  
This ‘turning the back’ and discrediting their politics and political personality has nothing to do with 
free speech or their democratic right of deliberation, but is precisely a counter-strategy to restore and up-
hold such democratic rights by exercising them (as someone has a right to speak, ok very well; but I have no 
duty to listen because the speaker has a responsibility, too, namely to uphold and defend exactly those 
rights that allow him or her to publicly speak); and is finally a question beyond political nine day’s wonders, 
but an issue of the intellectual and moral fabric of a society, of everyone of us, and of the sustenance of 
humanity. 
 The crucial question is whether, or not, the contemporary school and university systems in Western 
societies are up to the task of democratic citizen education and fit for this mission? Involved are here of 
course questions of social mobility, access to education and tuition fee systems, research assessments and 
evaluations, and of curricula design. This is a huge political agenda and research programme that, needless 
to say, cannot be adequately addressed in this paper. Therefore, the following considerations are necessari-
ly limited in their scope and concentrate on curriculum questions in English education institutions. 
 There are many voices on school and higher education, including education scholars, but also 
teachers and academics working in education institutions, who stress the neo-liberal transformation of cur-
ricula and the thereby reduction or even removal of humanities and citizenship studies. Neoliberalism 
shifted governance away from the state towards a system emphasising privatisation, competition, perfor-
mance management through audit cultures, and the cultivation of subjects who are expected to cope in the 
high pressure and risky cultures it produces. Schools and universities are supposed and have increasingly 
been expected to prepare children and young adults to succeed in such cultures by developing curricula 
that focus primarily on ‘transferable’ skills.  
The 1988 Education Reform Act, concluded under then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, intro-
duced corporate practices through bidding cultures, performance data collection, and niche marketing of 
6 
 
schools, and subsequent developments announced self-governing schools outside local authority control 
which could be formed in alliance with charities, faith groups, businesses, and other non-educational ac-
tors. The subsequent Conservative government of John Major passed an Education Act in 1992, mandating 
the inspection of schools by teams from the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills 
(Ofsted). The results of both these periodic inspections and public examinations are used to rank schools 
against each other in league tables, and to extend or terminate the contracts of staff. Indeed, a school’s 
‘survival’ is dependent on doing ‘well’ in auditing results, which come to be seen as determinants of the 
effectiveness, worth and value of a school. UK schools are thus considered examples par excellence of a 
neo-liberal audit culture in which schools are under pressure to constantly produce evidence of their effi-
ciency and effectivity. Some observers argue that the English schooling system is now constructed and con-
stituted through these data and the data infrastructures that manage them. As hitting key metrics is thus a 
top priority for a school, it has an enormous influence on how decisions about timetabling are made and 
curricula are drafted. This logic and the obsession with performance measurement and league tables does 
not stop at university doors, but actually continues into and seizes the Higher Education system, too. 
 There is plenty of critical analysis of the UK’s ‘Research Excellence Framework’ (REF) that puts 
scholarship under similar pressures of assessed research output and performance. Critics emphasise REF’s 
anti-innovative, mainstreaming, and matrix-driven character as well as immense running costs for universi-
ties to conduct it that lead to accelerated and thus eventually depth-lacking research activities plus psycho-
logical consequences especially for younger academics. Another, a novel government instrument to inter-
vene into Higher Education and to fast-track the neo-liberal shaping of UK universities is the ‘Teaching Ex-
cellence Framework’ (TEF; Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills). The overall design of the TEF is 
customer and skill oriented with “Employment Destination” and “Potential highly-skilled jobs metric” as the 
highest ‘Student Outcomes and Learning Gain’ criteria. The core metrics by which the accomplishments of 
those criteria is measured are the evaluation of three sets of questions from the so-called ‘National Student 
Survey’ (about “teaching quality”, “assessment and feedback”, and “academic support”) as well as the con-
tinuation or non-continuation of studies. Not only that everyone involved in the National Student Survey 
became familiar with, and insightful of, its shortages and deficits (and thus it is utterly questionable in how 
far it can serve as a fair and appropriate matrix, assuming that the quality of teaching and education can be 
measured, and instantly measured, at all: very often the appreciation of learning and teaching comes much 
later in life than when being an active student or pupil); but the role, expectations, and experiences of uni-
versity teachers and students become economically narrowed down to the function of “providers” and 
“customers” as if the university and learning would be a big market place. (The language of “customer” and 
“providers” is actually used widely in different versions of the mentioned document). And the positive out-
comes of teaching and learning are determined in the section “Aspects of Quality”, Paragraph 31, as mainly 
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consisting in the acquisition of (quotation) “knowledge, skills, and experience necessary to compete for a 
graduate level job and successfully securing graduate-level employment”. No mention of democracy, citi-
zenship, moral values, or critical thinking, let alone the language which is centred on the idea of com-
petiveness (rather than, for example, on solidarity or humanity).  
 Accordingly are curricula contents structured, and I reflect in the following on some experiences 
from teaching Politics at an English university. The typical curriculum is organised in twelve teaching weeks 
in which week 1 is usually used for an Introduction and week 12 for a Conclusion or revision for the assess-
ment; thus 10 content-specific weeks remain while there is usually one different sub-topic under the um-
brella of the general course theme each week. The time and space for debate and for the thoughtful elabo-
ration of questions and ways of how to engage them is thus genuinely very restricted (in addition to the 
constraints that are due to a Master degree of 1 year or a PhD programme of 3 years only). This restrictive 
time-content ratio is supported by so-called text books and their stunning sale rates in the UK that usually 
edit and reboil a topic in text-inserted boxes with summaries and key questions to remember about this 
very topic. (These boxes are often the only readings some students do, however, not because they are gen-
uinely lazy, but because they are – said and told to be – ‘customers’ and are embedded in a neo-liberal ed-
ucational culture of the consumption of ‘knowledge’; and what does a customer need to know: “how some-
thing is priced, but not why”; thus, such text boxes are epitomes of ‘transferable skills’). As Michael Sandel 
sharply and aptly observed, we do not only have neo-liberalism, but are (made) neo-liberal (subjects). 
Of course, there are exceptions, but the narrative above is intended to describe the usual practice 
as well as some indications of the neo-liberal seizure of Higher Education that could not be more dissimilar 
to an education culture (“Bildungskultur”) that allows for time and space for critical, profound deliberation 
(of different perspectives on a topic, their knowledge claims, and their evidence and validity) and that 
therefore realizes the idea of the university as shelter and hotbed for citizenry education and the develop-
ment of democratic political judgment. To come back to the considerations of the university as a condition 
for each democratic society and their mission to teach critical knowledge, the current UK education system 
does not fulfil this condition and mission and has moved a long way away from being able to assume this 
role (unless, and here lies a unique and maybe the only chance, staff and head of departments/head of 
schools are creative in carving out spaces that can operate detached from neo-liberal rationalities such as 
extra-curricula activities). These brief sketches about the UK education system may have revealed some 
generalizable patterns and trends, at least when looking into the US. (Looking into Scandinavia and Conti-
nental Europe is probably delivering different narratives as well as very different aspects of social mobility, 
access to education and tuition fee systems, research assessments and evaluations. UK and US develop-
ments can then serve at least as alerts.) 
What remains to be done? 
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Answers to this question, according to the analyses above, do not make optimistic. There will be 
short-term successes against totalitarian populist politics through constitutional, legal, and institutional 
fights and these are very important as they keep the democratic principles of rule of law and checks and 
balances alive and fundamentally belong to forms of democratic resistance. The restoration of political 
judgment and apperception and the thus recapturing of deformations (and here one may assume that 
populist manipulation find some conditions for their success already in place, thus utilize preceding defor-
mations of democratic politics as their fertile ground), however, might take some time. And if the argument 
made about education is correct, then it might even take generations and depends very much upon the 
reversing of the worst consequences of neo-liberalism – a Samson task. It seems therefore that we have to 
live with and resist populism and its totalitarian politics for quite some time until we have back a citizenry 
that is accomplished with political judgment and solidarity for their fellow human beings through these be-
ing/having become prime education objectives; and who prioritises the democratic common good over 
their own, individual advantages. The latter is difficult and one may have some understanding for (at least 
some of) the voters for Trump et al. as there are undeniably structural problems in our modern societies 
with elites, corruption, global economies that leave behind many, the employment market, hypostatized 
moral claims, etc.; however, likewise undeniably, the very wrong consequences are drawn as if Trump, de 
Wilders, le Pen etc. could solve these problems. It thus remains to be feared that large parts of their elec-
torate are and will be let down twice: by the real issues of mentioned problems and by ‘their’ leaders that 
cannot fix these problems through nationalism, protectionism, and unleashed economic deregulation and 
their violent phantasmagoria, in addition to the specific problem of their attempts to manipulate our 
minds. It remains to be hoped that a democratically and critically educated citizenry would come to realise 
this and comprehensively discredit populist leaders. 
 
